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Abstract: Somalia has been without any effective, central government for the last two decades. 
The UN Commission on Human Rights stated that “without a central administrative structure, it is 
not possible to lay down the foundations of a permanent program of human rights for Somalia”. 
On the other hand, there is a widespread consensus that, for a functioning central authority to be 
constituted, human rights protection should be made central to all attempts. Admittedly, it seems 
that the current effort to rebuild the collapsed state of Somalia is geared towards restoring a ‘mini-
malist’ state that can restore law and order without further thinking about the contextual circum-
stances and actual reasons, particularly human rights violations, which led to the collapse in the 
?irst place. This paper argues that it makes no sense rebuilding the same abusive state institutions. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. Firstly, it critically analyses the previous failed endeavours 
that tried to recreate the old order, without human rights components being implemented in the 
process. Secondly, it examines the role of human rights in creating a legitimate authority that can 
adequately protect human rights of the citizens. Finally, this paper suggests ways to embed human 
rights into all facets of state rebuilding.
Keywords: Human Rights, Somalia, State Collapse, Humanitarian Law, Africa, Horn of Africa.
1. Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter, the international law, by and large, 
concerned only international relations 
between sovereign states. The treatment 
any state accorded to individuals under 
its jurisdiction was left to the discretion 
of the state and its domestic laws and it 
was largely considered an internal affair of 
the sovereign country (Reisman, 1990, pp. 
866-876).In that connection, human rights 
were recognised as a subject “not, in prin-
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ciple regulated by international law”. In view of that, the Permanent Court of Internal 
Justice held in that context, “the jurisdiction of a State is exclusive within the limits 
ϐixed by international law,” and in consequence “[a]s regards such matter, each State is 
sole judge” (Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Maroco, Advisory Opinion, 1923).
The situation became much more complicated after the Second World War in compari-
son with the previous periods. The changes to international law with respect to the 
treatment of individuals are sometimes known as the “Nuremberg principles” because 
they were initially developed during the Nuremberg trials that followed the Second 
World War (Nash, 2009, p. 38). According to Kate Nash (2009, pp.2, 3), this principle 
inϐluenced international law in two ways. For a start, it was no more acceptable to hide 
behind the orders of the superiors, thus every individual is accountable for the contra-
ventions of international humanitarian law. Secondly and perhaps more signiϐicantly, 
human rights defenders became concerned with how citizens are treated within state 
jurisdiction. Nash argues that “it is only with collusion of state agents that human rights 
are violated, and only states can secure and enforce within their own territories”.
Human rights, arguably “has become a signal indicator for whether states are working 
in a post-conϐlict or international setting” (Ignatieff, 2005, pp. 59-75). Ignoring human 
rights protection in the attempts to reconstruct the Somali state made the situation 
more complicated. The following Somali adage is relevant in this case:”xaajo haddii lagu 
heshiin waayo waxaa ka maqan ama kusaa’id ah arrin”, roughly translated it means “if 
parties to a conϐlict cannot agree on an issue, either there is something missing from the 
agenda or something irrelevant in it”. There are a lot of things that have been missing 
from the peace and reconciliation conferences organised for Somalia, but I suggest that 
the most fundamental thing that was neglected was the embedding of human rights 
norms into all aspects of state-building from the start. 
This paper investigates the attempts to make human rights prominent in countries that 
are rebuilding without effective central governments and analyses the case of Somalia. 
The key conceptual issues pertaining to the role of human rights in state reconstruction 
are explained and then human rights protection with regard to the broader undertakings 
of state reconstruction and peace-building are considered. Similarly, this paper examines 
how to ensure the embedding of proper human rights accountability mechanisms in 
all attempts to rebuild collapsed state institutions.
2. Efforts to Reconstruct the Collapsed State of Somalia: The Missing Link
In general, two different phases can be identiϐied with respect to the efforts aimed at 
reconstituting an effective central government in Somalia. In the ϐirst decade after the 
collapse of the central authority from 1991-2000, there had been no government, no 
representation in the international fora, not even a nominal government. The seats of 
Somalia in international organisations where Somalia was a member remained unoccu-
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pied (Sahnoun, Prevention in Conϐlict Resolution: The Case of Somalia, 1994). However, 
after the year 2000, when the ϐirst Transitional National Government was established, 
there have been feeble transitional governments. Although recognised by international 
and regional organisations as “legitimate” governments, these transitional governments 
have not had control over Somalia outside parts of the capital city (ICG, 2011). In that 
respect, when the ϐirst transitional government was established in 2000, “no govern-
ment structure, such as a civil service, has existed in Somalia for more than a decade. 
The TNG inherited no personnel, buildings, archives, forces of law and order or tax-
collecting capacity” (UNSC, 2001)”.
However, the attempt by external mediators to ϐind a durable solution for the Somali 
crisis was complicated from the outset by lack of understanding of the complexity of 
the situation. As Mohamed Sahnoun, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
for Somalia observed during the early stages of the conϐlict, “[t]o look for quick ϐixes as 
political solutions, without taking into account the local realities is nonsense”. According 
to his informed opinion, “people in New York who knew nothing of the realities in the 
ϐield make hasty and uncalled for decisions and persist in having them implemented, 
despite evidence of mismanagement and strong objection of the people in the ϐield” 
(Sahnoun, 1997).
Even though human rights violations have been ongoing in many parts of Somalia una-
bated for over a decade, in 2004 the independent expert on the situation of human 
rights in Somalia, Ghanim Alnajjar, sounded an overly optimistic note on the overall 
human rights situation in Somalia. He conϐidently proclaimed that “[t]he past year 
has been marked by continued efforts towards political stability as well as the persis-
tence of distinct variations between regions in the observance of human rights” (UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 2004). Strangely enough, the names of the individuals 
consulted by the independent expert in his various visits to the country as well as to 
neighbouring countries included the names of prominent warlords who were accused 
of human rights violations.
Equally, after the conclusion of the Somali peace process in Nairobi in 2004 and the 
establishment of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the independent 
expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Ghanim Alnajjar, observed that the 
outcome of the conference indicated “a cautious optimism for peace and reconcilia-
tion for Somalia” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2005). However, the optimism 
seemed to have been a short-lived one. Even though the independent expert recognised 
the link between human rights observance and the attainment of peace and stability 
when he “encouraged the international community to support the Transitional Federal 
Government and Somali civil society in the critical human rights work that must occur if 
peace and security are to prevail in Somalia” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2005). 
Nowhere in the report is the role of the current leaders in past human rights violations 
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mentioned or discussed. It seems as if the past activities of these “leaders”bear no 
relevance to the present and future endeavours.
However, as Amnesty International observed: “[b]uilding respect for human rights can-
not be solely dependent on the complex and lengthy process of peacemaking, although 
peace between the armed groups is clearly essential for reconstruction” (Amnesty 
International, 1995, p. 6). In another vein, Amnesty International articulated that there 
is an intrinsic interplay between the protection of human rights and the quest to achieve 
peace. In that respect, any peace “agreement should incorporate speciϐic human rights 
guarantees and should contain effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms 
to ensure that human rights are respected and promoted” (Amnesty International, 
1995). Amnesty International emphasises the importance of the “commitment by all 
parties to respect and promote human rights and humanitarian standards”. However, 
the organisation realises that the pledges of faction leaders are worth little, because 
“[a]ll the Somali political organisation have made nominal and ‘paper’ commitments to 
peace, reconciliation and human rights in various conferences and peace agreements 
signedby their leaders” (Amnesty International, 1995, p. 13). The same individuals and 
their supporters were continuously invited to attend the next reconciliation conference 
without having seriously been questioned on their willingness to end the conϐlict. The 
reasons for their failure to abide by the previous commitments have not been investi-
gated or ascertained.
There is a general consensus that human rights protection and the improvement of 
the human rights situation of any particular country plays a vital role in “preventing 
the escalation of conϐlict into serious violence, as well as establishing a basis for long-
term stability and development” (Hannum, 2006, p. 5). In the case of Somalia, almost 
all the accords reached by the faction leaders gave warlords the mandate to construct a 
legitimate authority. It is claimed both by the international mediators and the warlords 
that these agreements would establish human rights-based institutions. In effect, this 
endeavour amounted to what one commentator called, in another context, “warlord 
democratisation” (Khayre A. A., 2016). This proposition is contradictory because it 
claims that human rights are priority, while at the same time empowering the same 
individuals accused of perpetrating heinous human rights violations (Khayre A., 2014).
Increasingly it is widely acknowledged that the provision of security is the most pri-
mary pillar in peace-building efforts, and at the same time the “building or rebuilding 
of public institutions is key to sustainability” (Samuels, 2006, p. 2).In fact, it is through 
state institutions that the future conϐlicts can be managed and perhaps recurrences of 
violence can be avoided (Samuels, 2006, p. 2). As the experiences in many post-conϐlict 
countries vividly demonstrate, silencing the guns without “modiϐication of the political 
environment” will probably be unsuccessful, no matter the amount of external assis-
tance and encouragement (Samuels, 2006). Furthermore, as Krishna Kumar observes, 
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“rebuilding institutional infrastructure shattered during conϐlict is as important, if not 
more important than physical infrastructure. It is an area which has largely been over-
looked by the international community in the past” (Kumar, 1997). The implementation 
of human rights requires a political reconstruction of the country. As the Commission 
on Human Rights recognised: “until such reconstruction, it is difϐicult to see how any 
human rights programme can be implemented effectively” (UN Commission on Human 
Rights, 1994, p. para.26).In that respect, human rights should be given a prominent 
position in the efforts to end the conϐlict because “the human rights dimension signals a 
fundamental change in the nature of the state” to be reconstructed (Shabas, 2007, p. 48).
3.  Human Rights Dimension in Reconciliation Attempts and Peace Agreements
In general, the fundamental purpose of international “peace-building”is to create a 
peaceful environment where fears of returns to the violent past are eliminated or at 
least substantially reduced in societies emerging from devastating civil warfare. The 
former Secretary-General Koϐi Annan deϐines the term “peace-building” as “actions 
undertaken at the end of a conϐlict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of 
armed confrontation” (Annan, 1998, p. para. 63). The situation appears observably 
much more precarious in fully collapsed states like Somalia, where all the central state 
institutions are entirely ruined and almost everything needs to be started from scratch. 
As Lederbacht argues, achieving peace requires “long-term commitment to establish-
ing an infrastructure across the levels of a society”, which “empowers the resources for 
reconciliation from within that society and maximises the contribution from outside” 
(Lederacht, 1997, p. xvi).
Additionally, the achievement of physical security and stability is the ϐirst of many 
challenging steps. In fact, sustainable peace and stable governance structure can only 
be put in place if functioning and effective state institutions are re-instituted and the 
newly constituted state is capable once again “to mediate effectively between distrust-
ful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain conϐidence in the safeguards contained 
within their new ethnic contract” (Rothschild, 1998, p. 349). The best way to do that 
is to establish state institutions based on the rule of law, and at the same time be ac-
countable to the general public. With respect to the inclusion of human rights language 
in the peace agreements, as Hannum observes:
The manner of implementation and the commitment of both the international 
community and national actors to that implementation are likely to be more 
important than the language in an agreement- although the latter at least 
creates the expectation that human rights concerns will be addressed in the 
immediate post-settlement period (Hannum, 2006, p. 44).
To be sure, after years of deadly conϐlict, signing a peace agreement or a military vic-
tory by one of the warring factions is merely the beginning. In fact, the silencing of guns 
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presents “a new set of opportunities that can be gasped or thrown away” (Rothstein, 
1999). More often than not, the success and failure of such processes is contingent 
upon how the post-conϐlict transition is managed. In order to prevent violent conϐlict 
from recurring, it is essential to somehow address the root causes of the conϐlict, not 
merely “surface manifestations such as the military culture and proliferation of weap-
ons” (Rothstein, 1999, p. 224). In view of that, “the process of peace-building calls for 
new attitudes and practices: one that is ϐlexible, consultative and collaborative and 
that operate from a conceptual understanding of the root causes of conϐlict” (Spence, 
2001, p. 137).
It is evident that, without institutional reform and the creation of a human rights-based 
governance system, including robust monitoring mechanisms and empowering rights 
institutions, human rights clauses alone will be insufϐicient (Hannum, 2006, pp. 46,47). 
Furthermore, some evidence seems to suggest “the formal enumeration of human rights 
provisions in settlements correlates only weakly, if at all, with the quantity and quality 
of human rights protection during and after peace implementation (Putnam, 2002, p. 
238). As Stedman notes:
All too often in the 1990s international and regional organizations were sent 
to implement peace agreements in extremely challenging environments where 
no major state possessed a security interest. When implementers were chal-
lenged, the mission failed, usually with catastrophic consequences (Stedman, 
Rothchild, & Cousens, 2002).
According to Brahimi (2007), when violent conϐlict erupts in a country, it is usually dif-
ϐicult to obviate the downward trajectory satisfactorily. International efforts to help end 
the conϐlict and establish peace and sustainable stability is often insufϐicient. In general, 
there are two recurring limitations that might negatively inϐluence the situation. First, 
“insufϐicient knowledge and understanding of local and regional conditions is one; the 
other is the low priority given by international players to the rebuilding of national 
institutions”. In effect, although the assistance of the international community can help 
conϐlict marred societies to end hostilities, “experience indicates that any state-building 
intervention will be sustained only through national structures” (Brahimi, 2007, p. 5).
In the Somali context, the United Nations frankly admitted that any gains made on 
the humanitarian front by the United Nations or other donor countries will amount 
to nothing and will not positively change the extremely fragile situation, ‘in the face of 
continuing insecurity and in the absence of a structured indigenous capacity’ to deal 
with the different challenges associated with societies affected by the prolonged conϐlict 
(UNSC, Further Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Operations in 
Somalia, 1994, p. para.3). Equally, any other achievement in the absence of legitimate 
state authority will probably be a temporary one.
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The United Nations invested a lot of resource in an attempt to rebuild state institu-
tions in Somalia during the UNOSOM II period in the early 1990s. In that regard, the 
Secretary-General reported to the Security Council:
[p]rogress is being achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the 
police and the judicial system. These achievements are grounds for hope that 
the Somali people can resume normal lives after the hardship that they have 
suffered over the last several years (UNSC, Further Report of the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Operations in Somalia, 1994, p. para.54).
In the same report, the Secretary-General stated, “there has been a signiϐicant dete-
rioration in the security situation, especially in Mogadishu, due to the resumption of 
inter-clan ϐighting and to a further increase in banditry” (UNSC, Further Report of the 
Secretary- General on the United Nations Operations in Somalia, 1994, p. para. 54). This 
demonstrates the importance and the necessity of creating political consensus and a 
legitimate authority before any rebuilding of institutions is undertaken. Any attempt 
to rebuild institutions will probably be futile in the absence of a legitimate national 
authority. 
4. Rebuilding the Old System or Starting from Scratch?
Once the guns are silenced after prolonged political violence, for the attained relative 
peace to be sustainable in the long-term, the hard work to create human rights-based 
governance should start as soon as practicable. As Katoboro suggests:
The solution lies in restoring (creating new) practices and institutions such as 
a new democratic constitution based on separation of powers, and checks and 
balances; holding elections based on political party competition. Autonomous 
bodies such as human rights institutions, electoral commissions, a vibrant 
civil society, a multiparty system, a strong constitutional court, and an open, 
free critical mass media will strengthen the organs of a re-emerging State 
(Katoboro, 2003, p. 3).
Furthermore, there is an obvious link between the extent of the collapse of state in-
stitutions and the challenges encountered in restoring political order. However, there 
might be a silver lining amid all the challenges and difϐiculties caused by state collapse. 
Beyond this seemingly irresolvable puzzle, there might be an:
opportunity to start from scratch without encrusted obstacles of the ancien 
regime attitudes, red tape, bureaucracy, and conservatism. It provides the 
opportunity for policy makers to be creative and innovative in rebuilding de-
mocracy and good governance in their countries (Katoboro, 2003, p. 8).
In almost all attempts to reconstruct the collapsed state of Somalia, it seems that there 
has only been one strategy which involves recycling the old regime, minus the president 
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and other senior ofϐicers, with a few negligible cosmetic alterations. Evidently, that has 
miserably failed to allay the fears of the general public and communities that another 
predatory system dominated by one clan will be put in place. As Salman Ahmed points 
out, “for peace to be self-sustaining the reconstruction process cannot be predetermined 
by generic templates and arbitrary time-frames; it must be shaped by the aspirations 
and deliberations of the men and women who will live with the results” (Ahmed, 2005, 
p. 169).
Given the fact that disrespect for the rule of law and lack of legal mechanisms to deal 
with the grievances of the citizens is deemed to be one of the root causes of the armed 
conϐlicts around the world, it is imperative to make sure that national institutions are 
capable of responding adequately and peacefully to the complaints and injustices before 
they cause violent conϐlict (UNSC-UNGA, 2003, p. para.18). According to the United 
Nations, “[r]espect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary components of 
any efforts to make peace durable” (UNGA-UNSC, 1998, p. para.72). Obviously, silencing 
the guns and creating a relatively stable environment is not enough to build sustain-
able political orderin collapsed states. However, “Even in those instances where secu-
rity is established, state-building has largely resulted in cosmetic political change and 
created weak, unstable, or even criminal states”. In the former President of Liberia’s 
words: “The state we produced turned out to be a criminal state, legitimized by elec-
tions” (Samuels, 2006, p. 4). Regrettably, it seems this is what has been unsuccessfully 
attempted in Somalia. 
Predictably, sometimes it is counterproductive to rebuild the old oppressive institutions, 
particularly when “Previously existing governance structures have been shown to be 
contributors to state fragility or failure in cases where they promote social, ethnic and/
or economic exclusion and inequalities; ignore human rights; abuse the rule of law; 
engage in corrupt practices,etc” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 11). Somali leaders explicitly pro-
claim their desire to bring back the pre-1991 governance system and its institutions, for 
that system is associated with peace and stability. However, these individuals perilously 
ignore the dominant role of the previous government institutions and leaders in state 
collapse. The police and military forces of the last military government were predatory, 
oppressive and corrupt. As Bruce Baker observes in another context “[s]imply changing 
the structure of organizations rarely affects operational behaviour, because it does not 
alter what the employees themselves think is expected of them” (Baker, 2006, p. 34). 
In Somalia, all consecutive governments established after the implosion of the central 
government in 1991, former military and police ofϐicers were called back without any 
vetting process and irrespective of their past records. Likewise, other individuals who 
occupied prominent positions in the last military government are still calling the shots. 
It is no wonder that citizens distrust the security forces and other government agents. 
It is against this backdrop that the attorney general of the country characterises the 
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central prison in the capital as a “concentration camp”, referring to the way the prison-
ers are treated.1
It seems that more importance is attached to order and stability “even when the pre-
vailing order is unjust”. Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, “this emphasis 
on order and stability clearly serves the interests of Western powers concerned about 
international insecurities stemming from drug trafϐicking, terrorism, or internal armed 
conϐlict abroad” (Call, The Fallacy of the ‘Failed States’, 2008, p. 1496). If the emphasis 
is blindly and narrowly put only on security without taking human rights into con-
sideration, then it can lead to legitimising warlords and other human rights violators. 
Given that the state institutions were predatory, corrupt and grossly mismanaged the 
daunting challenge for state rebuilding in such circumstances is how to create a strong, 
legitimate and effective state. As Richard Caplan notes: “to be legitimate the exercise of 
authority also requires mechanisms of accountability” (Caplan, 2004, p. 61).
It may be pointed out that attempts and policies solely focusing on security aspects 
mostly ignore the need not to reincarnate the authoritarian state but to build a new hu-
man rights-based state where the protection of the rights and dignity of the citizens are 
made central. Along the same line, a report compiled by a United Nations commissioned 
High-level Panel persuasively acknowledged the necessity to look beyond security para-
digms when rebuilding states and wrote: “[a]long with establishing security, the core 
task of state building is to create effective public institutions that, through negotiations 
with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governance within the rule 
of law”. The UN report put further emphasis on the importance of making the protection 
of human rights central to all the policies aimed at state building and stated:
Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and 
rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconcilia-
tion, and local capacity-building for public sector service delivery can greatly 
beneϐit long-term peace-building. This should be reϐlected in the policies of the 
United Nations, international ϐinancial institutions and donors, and should be 
given priority in long-term policy and funding (UN, Report of the Secratary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change- A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004, p. para.229).
Nevertheless, it is not as straightforward as it seems at ϐirst glance. It is necessary to 
ensure the centrality of human rights to the efforts to reform or rebuild state institutions; 
otherwise it may lead to empowering the wrong people and unintended perpetuation 
of human rights abuses. Furthermore, and more pertinently, pursuing narrow security 
objectives can be damaging to the future prospect of establishing a self-sustaining state 
1 See, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8mQ3ZdEZzD0
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based on human rights. As Charles Call aptly observes, “state-building can jeopardise 
peace, and contribute to insecurity and group tensions”. Undoubtedly, the situation is 
much more precarious “[W]here external donors provide resources to corrupt, preda-
tory central governments in the name of strengthening their institutions, state building 
only advances abusive authority and fuels sentiment and armed resistance” (Call, The 
Fallacy of the ‘Failed States’, 2008, p. 1499).
As Brahimi points out, to construct a state “there must be consensus on the type and 
shape of the state to be built and agreement between all parties as to the process that 
will be used to create the state” (Brahimi, 2007, p. 7). As the experience of complete 
collapse of state institutions in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein abundantly 
demonstrates “the provision of order is intimately linked to the much longer-term 
project of building a sustainable, efϐicient and representative state” (Dodge, 2005, p. 
707). However, the pertinent question is: is it enough to return to the old status quo 
or is more needed to construct a new credible entity? As the experience in Somalia 
for the last two decades painfully shows, recreating old abusive state institutions will 
not be enough to achieve sustainable peace, security and enhance the observance of 
human rights standards. 
5. Constitution Making in Somalia: Continuously Reinventing the Wheel
As experiences elsewhere in post-conϐlict situations demonstrate, creating a legal 
framework “within which law enforcement and judicial institutions could operate” is 
the ϐirst step (Strohmeyer, 2001, p. 173). Without a clear legal framework and judicial 
personnel appointments, the workings of the police, judges and prisons will be ham-
pered (Strohmeyer, 2001). In Somalia, during the military government, the country 
was ruled through a combination of presidential decrees, emergency laws and personal 
whim. However, before the military took over, the country had a popularly approved 
constitution adopted in 1960. In fact, during nine years of civilian democratic rule from 
1960-1969, the 1960 constitution had been the law of the land and there was a clear 
separation of powers. 
After the collapse of the central government, the Somali people had a choice: to use 
laws that existed prior to the military coup of 1969 or to create new applicable laws. 
Obviously, there are challenges associated with both choices. For instance, there are 
insufϐicient personnel with knowledge of the previous laws or expertise in enforcing or 
creating new ones. If properly conducted, the process of constitution making “can pro-
vide a forum for the negotiation of solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to 
violence” (Samuels, 2006, p. 5). Institutional reform is essential in the reconstruction of 
collapsed states like Somalia. Most often, abuses of power and incompetent governance 
lie at the heart of the state collapse and to obviate these problems “structures must be 
established in order to re-legitimise state power and make the peaceful management 
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of conϐlicts possible” (Baechler, 2004, p. 7). Constitution making is a tremendously sig-
niϐicant part of state reform after devastating conϐlict. However, constitutional reform 
alone will probably not be sufϐicient. After a protracted civil war, the security sector is 
entirely in ruins. The reconstruction and reform of the security sector is indispensable 
for any future political dispensation to be functional. 
It is not enough to reconstitute the state’s monopoly on violence, but this power ought 
to be “supported by appropriate political and democratic controls” (Baechler, 2004, p. 
16). In addition, as Kenneth Bush observes: ”status quo ante bellum is rarely a desir-
able state of affairs, and in most cases years of violent conϐlict and profound changes 
in the international political economy have destroyed any chance of returning to the 
status quo” (Bush, 1997, p. 2). Brahimi advises, “[c]onstitution-drafting should be closely 
linked to the peace-process, must not be rushed, and should be carefully aligned with 
existing legal provisions” (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). Surely, “[t]o build a state, there must 
be consensus on the type and shape of the state to be built and agreement between all 
parties as to the process that will be used to create that state” (Brahimi, 2007, p. 7).
The Somali people have had little say in deciding what kind of governance system best 
suits their country and its population. For example, the neighbouring countries and 
their negotiators pressured their client warlords to adopt a federal system of govern-
ment without any meaningful discussion on its merits, focusing solely on power shar-
ing or what some commentators call a “division of spoils” (Hart, 2003). The result is a 
provisional constitution that is likely to create new problems in lieu of solving existing 
ones. The reason is that, as Afyare Elmi points out, the constitution making process was 
“fundamentally ϐlawed because political expedience, secrecy, exclusion and hastiness 
mar [red] the mandate and selection of the commission members and the drafting of 
the document...” (Elmi, 2012).
As Jamal Benomar notes, in another context, “Constitutions produced without transpar-
ency and adequate public participation will lack legitimacy” (Benomar, 2004, p. 89). 
Nevertheless, “the formalized division of power along identity or ethnic lines appear 
to entrench the ethnic and divisive positions that have fuelled the conϐlict, rather than 
ameliorated them” (Samuels, 2006, p. 13).
By and large, constitution-making in post-conϐlict countries go through two stages. The 
ϐirst step is to draft a provisional charter “to delegate the formation and operation of an 
interim authority”. The second stage is “to draft and adopt a more permanent constitu-
tion and to hold democratic elections”. Experience, elsewhere in post-conϐlict countries 
in Africa, show that the choice of most countries had been to draft a new constitution 
(Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique) (Katoboro, 2003). However, even though new 
constitutions full of human rights provisions are drafted and adopted, most of these 
countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes with little respect for the rule of law. 
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In Somalia, after more than a decade of the existence of a transitional government and 
charter, no real attempt has been made to rebuild the judicial system. Practically, there 
are no national courts of the ϐirst instance or appellate courts to say nothing about a 
constitutional court. In 2011, on constitution making efforts in Somalia, the Secretary-
General stated: ”[t]he Somali Constitution Process is essentially about reconciliation, 
peace-building, and nation-building. The process must reconcile and unite the Somali 
people in a common cause” (UNSC, 2011, p. para.43). Since the collapse of the central 
government in 1991, three interim charters have been crafted. At the time of writing, 
a provisional constitution is in place and the plan is to be approved by a popular refer-
endum in 2016. Given the security situation of the country and the divisions between 
different groups, it is unlikely that it will be adopted in that manner. A selected group of 
citizens representing different regions may be asked to adopt the constitution. For the 
new constitution to become living document state institutions must be rebuilt and em-
powered and new leaders should be serious about the implementation of its provisions.
6. Human Rights Guarantees in the Somali Constitutions
Generally, the inclusion of human rights clauses in the drafted constitutions is seen as 
a step forward in the protection and promotion of human rights. However, as experi-
ence in Somalia demonstrates, if the constitution making is not accompanied by state 
reform and implementation, the provisions in the new constitution remain just words. 
Furthermore, empirical examinations demonstrate that there is no sufϐicient evidence 
to indicate that inclusion of human rights provisions in the constitution “produced an 
observable improvement on human rights behaviour” (Keith, 2002, p. 134). In Somalia, 
two Transitional Charters and the current provisional constitution have been drafted 
since the collapse of the central government in 1991. Let us now turn to the human 
rights provisions in these charters.
In its preamble, the Transitional National Charter adopted in 2000 recognises “the 
gross violations of human rights inϐlicted upon the Somali people and the need to re-
establish peace, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, the dignity and integrity of all 
Somalis”. It is signiϐicant that human rights violations are mentioned in the preamble of 
the new charter because it acknowledges the role of human rights abuses in the state’s 
collapse and the need to make human rights central to all endeavours to reconstruct it. 
This is the ϐirst charter adopted in Somalia since the collapse of the central government 
in 1991. The fact that armed faction leaders were not involved in the process of draft-
ing the new document made it easier for the drafters to acknowledge the paramount 
importance of human rights observance. The Transitional National Charter, adopted in 
Arta, Djibouti in 2000, recognised regional autonomy as the new governance structure 
based on the 18 regions that existed before the collapse of the central government in 
1991. The new charter also envisaged the separation of powers of the branches of the 
state such as the legislative, executive and the judiciary.
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The protection of human rights and adherence to international human rights standards 
gained prominence in the new charter. For instance, article 3 reafϐirms that Somalia will 
adhere to international human rights instruments to which it is a party and provides for 
the supremacy of law. In the same vein, article 4 recognises the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and reafϐirms the intention to implement the provisions of the two 
international human rights covenants both of which Somalia is a state party. Along 
the same line, articles 5 to 10 catalogue rights and freedoms accorded to the citizens 
including the right to life, freedom of movement and assembly, free speech and press 
freedom. The right to political participation is also enshrined in the charter. It is es-
sential to note that, the transitional national charter also called for the establishment 
of an independent human rights commission. 
Equally, the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter adopted during the Somali reconcili-
ation conference in Mbagathi, Kenya, explicitly incorporates the rights enshrined in 
the international human rights instruments. It seems that some of the provisions even 
surpass the rights guaranteed by advanced democracies. The Transitional Federal 
Charter takes a monist approach as opposed to dualist approach to international law 
(Maniruzzaman, 2001). That means that it abides by the provisions of the international 
human rights treaties to which Somalia is a party without any need to enact any further 
separate domestic laws. In that regard article 14 provides that Somali Republic “shall 
recognize and enforce all international human rights conventions and treaties to which 
the Republic is a party.”Article 11 paragraph 3 of the TFC stipulates that “(a) While 
the new Constitution is being drafted, a National Census shall be undertaken simulta-
neously. (b) After which an internationally supervised National Referendum shall be 
undertaken to approve the new Constitution”. Additionally, article 4 of TFC speciϐies 
that the provisions in the charter should be interpreted in a manner that ”national 
reconciliation, unity and democratic values”. In fact, the new provisional constitution 
was not approved by a popular referendum, but was adopted by a selected constituent 
assembly in August 2012.
Likewise, numerous other citizens rights are enumerated in the charter including the 
equality of citizens before the law (art.16), right to life, personal liberty and security 
(art.16), the right to assemble and the freedom to strike (art.19). Article 24 guarantees 
the right of every citizen to primary and secondary education. Article 25 provides for 
the rights to health care stipulating: “it shall be the responsibility of the government 
to protect and provide public health, safe motherhood and control of communicable 
disease”.
Nevertheless, in the absence of security and a functioning authority to willingly uphold 
the provisions of the constitution, the human rights violation in the country hascon-
tinued without substantial interruptions. Experience from different parts of the world 
“has shown that many constitutions... have often been mere ‘window dressing’ rather 
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than substantive protection for individual human rights” (Keith, 2002, p. 112). In that 
regard, the provisions in the Somali constitution, in the words of some commentators, 
could be characterised as purely “worthless scraps of papers” (Howard, 1991, p. 30). 
First, there are no meaningful courts, police forces or any other institutions to guarantee 
the rights enumerated in the document. Secondly, and more revealingly, most leaders 
of the successive transitional governments since the total collapse of the central gov-
ernment in 1991 have been individuals accused of masterminding the massive human 
rights violations of the country. Even the leaders of the current federal government 
who were not involved in past human rights abuses failed to establish the measures 
necessary to make the constitution relevant for the citizens. Lack of security is one of 
the reasons the rights enshrined in the constitution do not offer protection to citizens.
7. Prioritising Security Sector Rebuilding
There is a widespread consensus among scholars that, central to the political stability 
and to the reinstitution of viable, effective and legitimate public order in Somalia is 
the re-institution of effective internal security institutions including the police force, 
criminal justice and correctional systems. Experience elsewhere overwhelmingly offer 
evidence that, “long-term prospects for democratic governance and stability depend 
especially upon viable police, security forces, and justice structures to deal with the 
most salient internal threats...” (Wilson, 2006, p. 153). If public order is not restored 
immediately after the collapse of the ancient regime, it is likely that criminal forces will 
ϐill the void and use their newly acquired power for personal gain. In that regard, if peace 
and stability is to take hold and be sustainable, it is imperative that after silencing the 
guns, the ϐirst priority should be to create a credible internal security system without 
which any governance system cannot be established, as Puntman suggests:
Priority should be given to the demobilization of soldiers and the demilita-
risation of politics; that is, the transformation of soldiers into civilians and 
warring armies into political parties. The achievement of important norma-
tive goals such as protection of human rights and creation of accountability 
and democracy depends on the implementation of these transformations” 
(Stedman, Rothchild, & Cousens, 2002, p. 3).
In many conϐlict situations, nevertheless, reconstituting or reconstructing the police 
force is fraught with immense challenges. For instance, many members of the former 
police force may be implicated in human rights violations and corruption; and others 
may have actively taken part in the civil war in different capacities (Baker, 2006). In 
fully collapsed states where state institutions, including the police, have disintegrated 
and not functioned for years, it is more difϐicult and challenging to create a coherent 
and credible police force that can earn the trust of the public and thus legitimacy. 
The immediate challenge is to make a decision on whether to rebuild the old police 
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force, albeit with some reform, or start from scratch. Recreating the old police force 
and returning to ante-bellum may not offer solace, and may exacerbate the situation, 
given the fact that more often than not “oppressive policing, nepotism and corruption” 
characterised the old order. Furthermore, the repressive nature of pubic policing and 
its concomitant human rights violations were all “contributory factors to the outbreak 
and continuance of conϐlict” (Baker, 2006, p. 28).
As Baker catalogues, experiences elsewhere in Africa show that there are three pos-
sible ways to reinstitute a legitimate and effective police force. The ϐirst option is to 
purge the old police force and start recruiting a complete new force as was the case in 
Namibia. The second possibility is to reconstitute the old police force after subjecting 
them to meticulous screening and selection, purging anyone implicated in human rights 
abuses or other criminal activity and retaining the rest. This method was employed in 
Angola. The third way is to keep the rank and ϐile of the old police force and complement 
them with new recruits and management. This last option was used by Sierra Leone, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Rwanda (Baker, 2006, p. 29).
To be able to construct an effective and legitimate sustainable internal security, several 
serious conditions should be fulϐilled that might contribute to the achievement of that 
goal. First and foremost is the existence of a functioning government which meets the 
requirement of the Weberian “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical forces within 
a given territory”. In Somalia, a security sector assessment was carried out jointly by 
the United Nations Political Ofϐice for Somalia (UNPOS) and the United Nations with the 
cooperation of several countries and organisations including the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia, the African Union and the European Union. The Assessment 
was completed in January 2010. One of the key conclusions of the assessment was “the 
security sector reform may not be sustainable if a broader political foundation is not 
ϐirmly established within the time frame of the transition to promote good govern-
ance, transparency and accountability” (UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Situation in Somalia, 2010). Almost six years later, little seemed to change. The current 
police and military contingent of the government are mostly former militia members 
from the capital and the surrounding regions. Likewise, troops in other regions are 
clan militia loyal to the respective local administration. In the past, there were calls to 
integrate the different militias to form a credible national security force. In May 2015, 
the Somali government reportedly launched a new military academy designed to inte-
grate disparate militia forces in different parts of the country.
It is not clear yet how this integration drive will work. However, the newly appointed 
commission for Somali national army integration stated that they intend to integrate 
the militias loyal to different administrations without any vetting process. To make 
matters worse, in the last ten years countless ex-militiamen and civilians without any 
prior military or police experience have been promoted to the rank of general. 
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In consequence, attempts to reconstruct the collapsed state of Somalia and its institu-
tions have failed, because human rights were not made central in all efforts. A compe-
tent national police force is a prerequisite “for the restoration of the rule of law and 
of public security, but also crucial to the broader process of restoring state legitimacy 
and a state-held monopoly on the legitimate use of force” (Donais, 2005, p. 271). For 
Somalia to have any chance of arresting the downward spiral of statelessness, violence 
and human rights violations, an effective security system should be established. In turn, 
for security forces to be effective a legitimate authority must be in place to gain the 
trust of the population in the new security force.
8. Rebuilding the Justice Sector
In societies emerging from prolonged civil wars, it is argued “the justice system can 
play an important role both in successful investigation of past abuses of human rights 
and in effective prevention of future violations” (Wardak, 2004, p. 331). However, if 
individuals accused of perpetrating heinous atrocities are given inϐluential positions of 
power, it is unlikely that any meaningful investigation can take place. As Wilets notes, 
“human rights cannot be respected in a vacuum. Acceptance of human rights treaties 
and formal acceptance of human rights norms is meaningless without the rule of law” 
(Wilets, 2001, p. 597).
Wilets continued, “the rule of law cannot exist unless society itself creates independent 
civic institutions to monitor observance of human rights and encourage compliance 
with human rights norms” (Wilets, 2001, p. 599). In Somalia, after decades of violent 
civil war between various warring parties and a total collapse of all central government 
institutions, reinstituting a sustainable justice system is a tremendously daunting task. 
All the justice infrastructure including police stations and headquarters, prison facili-
ties and courthouses have been destroyed. Equally, all government personnel including 
police ofϐicers, judges and prison ofϐicers have either left the country, are living in exile, 
or are accused of taking part in past human rights violations. Against this rather bleak 
backdrop, new government institutions have to be re-established from scratch for there 
are no institutions to be reformed.
In May 2012, the independent expert on human rights urged the leaders of the transi-
tional government to restore the justice system. The UN expert, Shamsul Bari stated: 
’Strengthening access to justice and rule of law in the country is crucial to protect and 
promote the fundamental rights of the Somali people’. Furthermore, the independ-
ent expert recognised, “[r]e-establishing a legitimate justice system in Mogadishu and 
South-Central Somalia presents a major challenge, but also an opportunity for the in-
ternational community”. He was alarmed by the “total collapse of the institutions for 
law enforcement and the administration of justice”.2 It is clear from this statement 




that the efforts of the last two decades to re-establish a functioning justice system on a 
national level have been unsuccessful. Second,without a working justice system, other 
efforts to consolidate state institutions will have little impact on the conϐlict situation.
To create a legitimate justice system, it is imperative to identify individuals who were 
tainted by human rights abuses and corruption. If these individuals are allowed to get 
involved again the credibility of the whole system would be in jeopardy. In post Saddam 
Hussein Iraq, a Judicial Review System was put in place to screen all former employees 
and purge anyone involved with previous offenses. In consequence, “over 800 judges and 
prosecutors had been investigated and approximately 170 were removed” (Williamson, 
2004, p. 238). However, several factors inϐluence or determine the options available to 
the new authority. To be sure, the duration of the conϐlict and the effectiveness of its 
institutions play a pivotal role. For instance, totally collapsed states like Somalia em-
broiled in ongoing conϐlict may have more limited options than in a situation where one 
group won the civil war, like Rwanda or where the conϐlict ended due to a negotiated 
settlement like Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo.
State reform covers more than the mere rebuilding of institutions and a change of 
individuals. In addition to “forging democratic development, the participation of the 
population and the rule of law, it will also develop structures that can offer an effec-
tive means for the peaceful management of deep rooted conϐlict”. Additionally, “poorly 
designed state reform can even lead to the deterioration of a conϐlict” (Baechler, 2004, 
p. 2). As Baechler rightly observes: “If a transition process to peace and development 
is to be sustainable, it must enjoy the support of the entire population and not only the 
political elite” (Baechler, 2004, p. 4). It seems that the manner in which leaders come 
to power has a profound bearing on the way the country is subsequently governed. For 
example, Baechler argues that “[b]ad governance and poor state performance quite 
often coincide with leadership that has reached power through a coup d’état, seces-
sion or civil war” (Baechler, 2004, p. 6). It is also recognised that maintenance of law 
and order “is a multi-dimensional effort that not only comprises the police but also the 
prosecution service, judiciary and correctional systems” (Strohmeyer, 2001, p. 171). 
The next sections will separately analyse the different components, like the necessity 
to reform police and judicial systems, as an overall project.
8.1. Building a Credible Police Force
The reconstruction of national institutions is challenging, and as the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations acknowledged: “Restoring the capacity and legitimacy of na-
tional institutions is a long-term undertaking. However, urgent action to restore hu-
man security, human rights and the rule of law cannot be deferred” (UN, Report of 
the Secretary-General on the Rule of Lawand Transitional Justice in Conϐlict and Post 
Conϐlict Societies, 2004). Charles Call (2008) articulately argues that police reform 
is informed by ϐive different perspectives. He further asserts that these perspectives 
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overlap and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The ϐirst one is the human rights 
perspective which entails the necessity to embed international human rights standards 
in all facets of police work. In this perspective, all human rights violators are removed 
from the forces and new recruits need to undergo rigorous vetting so as not to admit 
any human rights abuser into the police force. The second one is the peacekeeping per-
spective which is concerned with maintaining peace and stability by integrating all the 
different combatants into one coherent force. In this perspective, all the actions of the 
police and its reconstitution are geared towards preventing a recurrence of the violent 
conϐlict. Unlike the human rights perspective, the human rights record of the members 
of the police force is not a serious concern.
The third is a law-enforcement perspective, which focuses on creating an effective police 
force capable of combating crime. Consistent in some respects with the peace-keeping 
perspective, this approach is not necessarily concerned with the past activities of the 
recruits or old ofϐicers. Rather, the emphasis is on retaining more experienced police 
ofϐicers who are able to pass their invaluable knowledge and experience to the new 
recruits. Obviously, this perspective ignores other possible methods to gain experi-
ence without legitimizing the past criminal activities of the police ofϐicers. The fourth 
perspective is the economic development perspective which is somewhat related to the 
law-enforcement perspective, both of which emphasize control of crime so that a safe 
environment conducive to investment can be created. Finally, there is the democratiza-
tion perspective which focuses on not only human rights but is also concerned with the 
broader rule of law and criminal justice issues (Call, 2002, pp. 100-110).
It seems that almost all attempts to rebuild the Somali police and justice system have 
been along the lines of the peacekeeping perspective detailed above and to a lesser extent 
the law-enforcement perspective. After the collapse of the central government in 1991, 
the central police authority disintegrated, and police ofϐicers ϐled to their respective 
hometowns and villages. Some directly participated in the civil war while others were 
recruited by local administrations to be part of the local police force. The UN intervention 
force attempted to train and reinstate police forces in their respective locality (Halim, 
1996). However, as soon as the UN troops withdrew from Somalia in 1995, members 
of the police forces trained to ϐill the security void dispersed. From then on, despite 
attempts from the transitional leaders and the international community, no national 
police force became operational until 2001.
In 2000, after a decade without a central government, a transitional national govern-
ment was established as a result of a reconciliation conference held in Arta, Djibouti. 
The transitional national government tried to reconstitute the national police force. 
The members of the police force consisted of some old police ofϐicers who were trained 
before the outbreak of the state collapse and others recruited from the faction lead-
ers. These former militia members lacked discipline, equipment, and the wider public 
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had no trust in them. Furthermore, and more worryingly, a known warlord who had 
been accused of massive human rights violations was named as the commander of the 
national police force. He recruited his militia members from local warlords who owed 
allegiances to their clan or faction leader. When the term of the transitional government 
was about to end, he defected from the government taking most of the police force with 
their equipment and subsequently used them as his militia, manning illegal roadblocks 
and running extortion activities. In 2002, an Amnesty International report documented 
the human rights abuses perpetrated by the police force and other militia groups.3
After almost ϐifteen years of attempts to reconstruct the Somali police force, it is com-
monly acknowledged that no meaningful headway has been made in establishing a 
sustainable local police force capable of maintaining law and order and ensuring the 
security of the citizens. The pertinent question that might be asked is: why have differ-
ent efforts failed so far?. In conϐlict shattered countries like Somalia, security generally 
entails arresting ongoing hostilities, demobilising and rehabilitating the former combat-
ants, the reinstitution of effective and legitimate central government and securing the 
country’s borders from external threats. It is essential to understand the nexus between 
civil security and state security which are often complementary. 
In that respect, “state security concerns rise and fall with the level of threat against a 
nation, while civil security must always be present to ensure the rule of law and “to 
keep the peace” (Murry, 2011). As often is the case, by and large state security is usually 
protected by national military forces and intelligence services in collaboration. On the 
other hand, “civil security is the preserve of civilian police. While there is some blurring 
at the line of demarcation, as a general principle, police do not ϐight wars, and national 
armies are not used against civilian populations” (Murry, 2011).
In November 2011, according to the United Nations, the Transitional Federal Government 
had approximately 10,300 security forces in the capital city alone, including troops 
trained by the European Union in Uganda (UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Situation in Somalia, 2011, p. para.36). However, attempts to reconstruct state in-
stitutions, which are prerequisite for building effective governance, neglected the root 
causes of the conϐlict including human rights violations, and concentrated on tackling the 
symptoms of the conϐlict. Warring militias beholden to the warlords or faction leaders 
formed the backbone of all the police and military force. As a result, inϐighting, wide-
spread mistrust of the people and defecting to his old militia when his warlord patron 
is dissatisϐied with the political dealing of the day characterised the police recruitment 
exercises. For instance, after spending millions of dollars on recruitment and training in 
the capital city Mogadishu, according to the United Nations, “there are numerous reports 
of looting, murder and sexual violence carried out by armed men in military uniforms 
3 Amnesty International Report 2002, AL index: POL 10/001/2002
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against internationally displaced people” (UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Situation in Somalia, 2011, p. para.68). The alleged corruption of the government 
institutions including the police force is also widespread.
Police reform is challenging particularly in situations where the police force has been 
accused of committing heinous crimes under the previous government. It is much more 
daunting and difϐicult in circumstances where the police force has disintegrated and 
has been out of action for more than a decade. As O’Neill agues: “police reform takes a 
long time, involves transforming power relations in a society and requires more than 
technical tinkering with police doctrine and practice” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, 
“police reform must be carried out in tandem with judicial reform. Modernizing laws, 
training judges, making courts more efϐicient and humanising prisons are all part of 
‘rule of law’” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 3). As O’Neil further argues that, “training and increased 
knowledge of rights will not single-handedly change behaviour or prevent human rights 
violations by police” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 4).
However, any amount of training could not transform the corrupt police force if there is 
no possibility of an independent complaint mechanism and enforcement. The current 
Federal Government troops are mostly comprised from militia of the warlords and fac-
tion leaders who have been involved in the civil war and human rights violations in the 
past decades. Furthermore, most of the military and police commanders are former of-
ϐicers who served under the repressive military government. No attempt has been made 
to vet and screen them. In that respect, it is unreasonable to expect them to safeguard 
the human rights of the citizens. The Secretary-General of the United Nations reported, 
“[p]oor command and control over TFG forces and the loose integration of militia and 
clan-based divisions led to a serious of incidents resulting in civilian casualties” (UNSC, 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, 2011, p. para.28).
During the United Nations intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s, the United Nations 
mission allocated a lot of ϐinancial resources and manpower to training the police force 
and refurbishing courts and police stations. The Security Council recognised that re-
constituting an effective police force, judicial and penal system is a prerequisite for the 
creation of a peaceful and stable environment in Somalia.4In that respect, the United 
Nations and donor countries spent a considerable amount of money and resources to 
train Somali police force. In May 1994, the total number of police ofϐicers recruited and 
trained was 7,799. The initial UNOSOM policy regarding re-establishment of the Somali 
police was that only individuals who served a minimum of two years as a police ofϐicer 
in the previous military government was eligible for the new recruitment.
However, it seems that the United Nations overlooked the fact that, without a legitimate 
domestic political authority or other governance structure in place, all these efforts were 
4 SC Res 865 (1993)
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in vain. That is exactly what happened when the UNOSOM II troops were withdrawn; 
the trained police dispersed and court and police buildings were taken over by local 
militias loyal to different faction leaders. In that respect, the United Nations later ad-
mitted, “[t]he protracted political impasse has created a vacuum of civil authority and 
of governmental structure, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on its 
efforts to help Somalia emerge from its present chaotic condition”. As a consequence, 
“the presence of UNOSOM II troops has had limited impact on the peace process... and 
security”. Sometimes it is easier and much more efϐicient to recruit and train new police 
force who are not tainted by corruption or any other ill practice.
If we sufϐiciently analyse the successive Somali governments established in the last 
decade and half, and their attempts to reconstitute the police and military force, a 
clear pattern emerges. First, a transitional government is formed mostly comprising 
warlords. Former government ofϐicials without any vetting or clear strategy are trusted 
to reconstruct a legitimate authority in the country. Subsequently, the United Nations, 
donor countries and human rights organisations enthusiastically welcome the new 
government and urge them to respect human rights. After that, the government brings 
the militia of the warlords without any vetting or proper training and lets them police 
the areas under the control of the government. Given their past activities and the lack 
of any future safeguards to protect the abuses of the police and military personnel, the 
population continues with their distrust of the police and the military. The UN provides 
training and human rights protection lessons, but to no avail. When a new government 
is created the cycle starts all over again. 
For example, in 2009, immediately after the creation of the transitional government 
after the Djibouti agreement, the United Nations suggested that:”[i]n the short-term, 
the Somali police force needs advice, ongoing training and logistical support through 
a trust fund”. The report went on to state: “In the medium term, infrastructure and 
specialised police training will be essential”. Surprisingly, the UN notes, “in the long 
term police reform and a restructuring programme should be implemented in line with 
the national security sector strategy for Somalia”5. It appears a confused prioritisation. 
Training and equipping ϐirst, and thinking about reform and restructuring later. There 
are several problems with this proposal. First, it seems that the UN and other organisa-
tions conveniently overlook the fact that a known warlord was named as police chief 
and “re-hatted” his militia to become the police force. Second, and more worryingly, 
this statement suggests that money and resources should be invested in training and 
strengthening warlords, before making another effort to “reform”. It is likely that the 
new police will be resistant to the proposed reform as it collides with their warlord’s 
vision of maintaining the status quo.
5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/2009/132, 9 
March 2009, para.42
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Since its inception, tens of thousands of both military and police personnel have been 
trained for the Transitional Government of Somalia. These troops have not only failed 
to protect the civilians but they actively participated in violating their basic rights. More 
strikingly still, there is constant inϐighting between different groups within the troops 
themselves. For example, recently when the European Union announced that it would 
train military forces for the Somali government, warlord militia or clan militia had been 
sent to be trained as the new security force without any vetting. In consequence, the 
wider public had no faith in the forces trained to restore order, thus lack any legitimacy 
in the eyes of the populace. Such situations inevitably create circumstances where 
victims of warlord militia are confronted with their erstwhile oppressors who are now 
supposed to be the ones responsible for their safety. This puts the pubic in an uneasy 
situation. Even though they are willing to support the new authority, they cannot trust 
the enforcement arms of that authority. The fact that no one is held to account for the 
previous atrocities makes the situation more complicated. If the perpetrators of past 
human rights abuses confess and seek forgiveness, this might give the public a reason 
to give the new recruits the beneϐit of the doubt. However, known criminals and their 
leaders have been selected to maintain public order without any safeguards or means 
to seek remedy for any future transgressions on the part of the security forces. In that 
light, there is constant deadly inϐighting between government forces loyal to different 
former warlords or other individuals. If for whatever political reason it is decided to 
retain the old police force without any vetting, it is essential to create a complaints pro-
cedure and an internal organ within the police force where the public can report police 
abuses, corruption or any other dissatisfaction. Experience elsewhere in Africa shows 
that such measures givethe public conϐidence that their complaint will be heard. For in-
stance, In Sierra Leone a “Complaints Discipline and Internal Investigation Department” 
was instituted to give the wider public an opportunity to report any police malpractice 
such as human rights violation and bribery. Following complaints from the public and 
subsequent investigations, roughly 100 police ofϐicers accused of various malpractices 
were dismissed between 2001 and 2006 (Baker, 2006, pp. 33,35).
To have any chance of success, police reform and other efforts to rebuild effective police 
forces must be part of a broader institutional building exercise. In Somalia, there have 
been at least three instances where the international community attempted to support 
the reinstitution of Somali national police force. First, during the UN intervention in 
the early 1990s, an attempt was made to rebuild a police force at the local level. There 
were also separate developments at regional level. The United Nations and other donor 
countries are also involved in helping some parts of Somalia, particularly Somaliland 
and Puntland, to create a functioning justice system including police, judiciary and 
penal facilities. 
Interestingly, in all attempts to reconstruct the Somali national police or military force, 
scant attention has been given to the past activities of the police force or the current 
44
Con?lict Studies Quarterly
political organisations of the present leaders. During the military government and sub-
sequent transitional governments, both the police and military have been implicated in 
massive human rights abuses. As experiences elsewhere amply reveal, effective policing 
does not only require recruiting individuals for the force, but also requires:
the establishment of political architecture of public safety, a complex of jus-
tice-oriented governance mechanisms that link policing agencies not just to 
prosecutors, courts and corrections, but also to the exercise of ministerial 
power and planning and control of resources by bureaucrats (Goldsmith & 
Dinne, 2007).
For any police force to win the trust of the people, the support and acceptance of the 
population is essential. Different approaches are chosen to achieve that goal. For in-
stance, in Haiti and El Salvador, the preference was not to rely on the old tainted police 
force but to start from scratch with the new security force. However, it is necessary 
to realise that, police reform without broader political reform is not going to work 
(Donais, 2005, p. 4). In Somalia where the police force and other state institutions have 
not been functioning for the last two decades, it is less attractive to recall the old police 
force for several reasons. First, most members of the police force are known for their 
corruption and oppression. They were used by the previous military government to 
repress dissent. Second, and perhaps more pertinent, the majority of the old police force 
have passed retirement age. For any reform to work, the whole justice sector should 
be reformed including the police, judiciary and penitentiary system. After more than 
twenty years without functioning institutions on a national level, the facilities are either 
entirely destroyed or are crumbling. The lack of security forces has given rise to private 
armies and local militia which in turn has created insecurity and led to widespread 
human rights abuses. The police force of the federal government is faction-ridden and 
is incapable of fulϐilling policing duties even within only the capital city, let alone the 
whole country. It is not only necessary to reform the police force, but this has to occur 
in tandem with judicial reform. 
9. Concluding Remarks
In a report to the Security Council in May 2010, the UN Secretary-General pertinently 
described the dire human rights situation in Somalia: “[t]he overall security situation 
in Somalia remains highly volatile and unpredictable”6. Equally, the Secretary-General 
noted that the “human rights situation in Somalia has been among the most neglected 
in the world...”7. This indubitably demonstrates that all the efforts in the last two and 
6 UN SC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/2010/234, 11 May 2010, 
para. 8
7 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/2009/132, 9 
March 2009, para. 44
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half decades failed to ameliorate the suffering of the population satisfactorily. In con-
sequence, massive human rights violations continue insubstantial parts of the country 
unabated.
Usually human rights abuses occur both horizontally and vertically. The vertical human 
rights violations entail state agents abusing the rights of the citizens, being unable to 
protect them, or by creating an environment where human rights violations are toler-
ated. With respect to horizontal human rights, abuses occur between citizens without 
the involvement of state agents. Usually, a state without proper checks and balances 
violates the human rights of the people under its jurisdiction. Initially it was though 
that states with too much power were prime enemies of human rights. However, there 
is a belated realisation that a complete lack of state institutions is more a threat to 
the human rights than too much of it. In situations where state institutions are ruined 
the twin functions of the state are unfulϐilled. For a start, the state does not hold the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. As a result, the state is unable to provide 
any political goods like health, education, security and economic development. The two 
functions are intertwined and interdependent.
In Somalia’s case, the prolonged conϐlict has made the majority of citizens passive spec-
tators because “many citizens are hesitant to become overly involved in the political 
rebuilding process, having been conditioned by wartime realities to defer to individuals 
who exercised authority through the barrel of the gun” (Orr, 202, p. 139). Evidently, “the 
single most important factor that determines the success or failure of a post-conϐlict 
reconstruction effort is the extent to which a coherent, legitimate government exists- or 
can be created” (Orr, 202). In that connection, it is crucial that the international effort 
to help the collapsed states to create legitimate governance should revolve around two 
speciϐic activities. 
First, all the efforts must be directed at creating a legitimate governance structure. The 
best way to create such a legitimate government is to make certain that, in accordance 
with international human rights standards, the population have unhindered access to 
the political process and can extend this participation. To that end, creating a govern-
ment with no support from the population is not enough and might exacerbate the 
already calamitous situation. Second, once a legitimate entity is constituted, its capacity 
should be strengthened so as to enable it to provide essential public goods which in 
turn would further augment the legitimacy of the new government (Orr, 202, p. 140). 
Unless that happens all the efforts towards human rights protection in Somalia will 
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